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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do Utah State Courts have personal

jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer and/or a Japanese
exporter for a personal injury claim that arises out of the use
of one of their "Japanese" products in Utah, when the product
is regularly offered for sale in Utah, but was actually
purchased in Idaho?
2.

Did Japanese manufacturer Hirota Tekko

K.K. waive its claim that the Utah state courts did not have
personal jurisdiction over it by submitting a pro se answer to
Mansour's counsel, that was addressed to the Utah District
Court?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes and rules of civil procedure
may be controlling and determinative of this issue:
a. Utah Code Ann, §78-27-24(3) (the Utah
long-arm statute) states as follows:
Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising
from: . • .
(3) The causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; . . .
b. Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states as follows:

Waiver of Defenses.
A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that
the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party, and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to
a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if
one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial,
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b)
in the light of any evidence that may have been
received.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce Parry filed this action
for personal injuries he incurred through the use of a WECO
chopping maul.

He named as defendants the Japanese

manufacturer, Hirota Tekko, K.K., a respondent herein,
Japanese exporter Okada Hardware Company, Ltd., a respondent
herein , U.S. importer Mansour, Inc., an appellant herein,
United States wholesaler Pacific Marine Schwabacher, and
United States retailers Ernst Home Centers and Pay fN Pack.
Defendants, and third-party defendants, Okada and
Hirota are Japanese business entities.

They each filed

motions to dismiss all the claims against them, on the basis
that the Utah court lacked personal jurisdiction over them.
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On

February 25, 1986, the Second Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding, entered a ruling granting
each motion to dismiss.
On March 17, 1986, Bruce G. Parry filed a motion with
the Second Judicial District Court asking Judge Page to
reconsider his ruling dismissing the claims against Okada and
Hirota.
On April 17, 1986, Judge Page entered a second ruling
and an order affirming his earlier decision to dismiss all
claims against Okada and Hirota.

On April 30, 1986,

plaintiff Bruce G. Parry filed a motion to have the Court's
order certified as a final order under Rule 54(e).
On May 5, 1986, Judge Page entered an amended order
dismissing all claims against Okada and Hirota and
specifically finding that his order of dismissal was a final
order as defined by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Appellant Mansour originally filed a notice of
appeal on May 21, 1986.

Plaintiff Bruce G. Parry joined in the

appeal by filing an amended notice of appeal on May 30, 1986.

II
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Bruce G. Parry was injured on January 3,
1981, while chopping wood with a WECO chopping maul.

The

WECO chopping maul was originally manufactured by respondent
Hirota.

Hirota sold the product to Japanese exporter
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Okada Hardware.

(Finding of Fact, Nc

Ruling attached

-endix '"A.")

~, February 25, 198 0

Okada Hardware soli1 the pn;
importer appellant Mansour, Ir«
-

produ •

^ United States

Mansour

, so id ll«i-«

-• Pacific Marine Schwabacher,

Marine Schwabachei

Pacific

Jbutor, sold the

retailers Ernst Home Center and Pay l\\ l-ack.

product
(Pii

-, A :, February 25, 1986 Ruling,

attached as Appendix "A.")
The chopping maul Mr

„

v

i, ) l,m«1a Thayne from an Ernst retail outlet .

, urchased
hi

. ::

Thayne purchased tin chopping maul *- a Christmas present for
her father, who resides in Utah,
her" father at Christmas in 198 0
from, Mr

-. * the maul to
^

Parry borrower

-^

v.l

Thayne, and was using i t :i i i Utah at the Lime of the

accident.

(Findings of F act, Nos

6 K "', February 25, 1986

Ruling, attached as Appendix M A.")
A

• ?

* * e Injury, Ernst and Pay f N Pack

advertised

and model of chopping maul

in their; retail outlets throughout Utah

(E* -•" \nswers to

Interrogatories, attached as Appendix "B," Apr.,
Ruling, n' t tu.ii(*• i a& Appendix

, 19B6

,f

C,ff)

Mansour had submitted nunierous orders to Okada
Hardware for an extended period of time pr K M I M January1 3,
orders included the purchase and importatioii of
WECO products
involved here.

in, (i -; n J» i ,i | . huppincj mauls identical to the one
During the transactioi i of business with Okada

and Hirota, Mansourfs representatives traveled to Japan to
confer with representatives from Okada and Hirota.

During

this same period, representatives from Okada and Hirota
traveled to Los Angeles to confer with representatives from
Mansour.

During these discussions the Mansour

representatives explained the nature of their business,
including the fact that they intended to sell and distribute
the Japanese products throughout the western United States.
The Okada and Hirota representatives never placed any
restrictions upon the sale of their products into any
particular region or state.

(Affidavit of Mansour, paras. 7

& 8, attached as Appendix ffD.fl)
Mansour Inc.'s Third-Party Complaint was served upon
Hirota pursuant to the Utah long-arm statute and the
Hague Convention.

On or about September 9, 1985, Robert G.

Gilchrist, counsel for Mansour, received a letter styled as
an Answer, dated August 26, 1985, and signed by Hirotafs
president Masakazu Hirota.

Mr. Hirotafs "Answer" stated

that his company had no responsibility for this action.
attached letter, Appendix "E.")

(See

On the same date, September 9,

1985, the letter was forwarded by Mr. Gilchrist to the Second
Judicial District Court for the State of Utah.

Subsequently,

Hirota filed its Motion to Dismiss.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants seek to have Judge Pagefs order of
dismissal set aside for two reason.
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First, on the basis

that tnt "'..Hi otalt1 courts have jurisdiction over both Japanese
defendants,

fhe i1,,1! t>upi eini < (IMJII 'LIS developed a stream of

commerce theory and foreseeability test, that "-.NIHS ' hat if a
manufacture! r directly or indirectly places ' *-- product in a
statefs market, that

unreasonable for the

manufacturer to be subject to jurisdicti .1 in i I.IM state. The
Japanese,- manufacturer and exporter sold this product •.
importer, knowjui 1 1.11 it would be sold throughout the western
United States.

The product was sol d 01 1 a 1 egular basis '. the

State of Utah.

The actual maul in question was p

-;>

the Japanese manufacturer and exporter had
placed the same product 111 ''tali1,1- stream of commerce, they had
the necessary minimum contacts for the Utah si,ate courts to
exej'visp lurisdiction over them.
Secondly, Hiroi.a has waived any jurisdictional
claims

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that the

defense of lack

oersonal jurisdiction be raised in the

defendan

esponsive pleading.

submitted a pro

respons

Defendant Hirota
ounsel or record,

denying that :* lad any responsibility

.nis

response •.-*?• captioned as . answer and was sent t
4

address that submitted to t
count

It was immediately

Second Judicial

• record.

have , ^

-he only

Mansour's

The answer did not claim the Cuuit
sdiction over Hirota,

defense was waived.
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.11 d not

Therefore this

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH STATE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE JAPANESE
MANUFACTURER AND JAPANESE EXPORTER UNDER THE
STREAM OF COMMERCE THEORY.
This matter involves a personal injury claim arising
out of the use of an allegedly defective product.

The product

was manufactured and sold by various non-Utah entities.
The plaintiff and third-party plaintiff thus have had to rely
on the Utah Long-Arm Statute, U.C.A. §78-27-24 to
obtain jurisdiction over these defendants.

Specifically, the

plaintiff and third-party plaintiff have relied on a section of
this statute which states as follows:
Any person, not withstanding section
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself and if an
individual, his personal representative, to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any claim arising from: . . .
(3) The causing of any injury within this
state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty; . . .
Mr. Parry was injured while using the Japanese
product in the State of Utah.
Long-Arm Statute was met.

Therefore, this provision of the

However, this Court has repeatedly

stated that Utah court1s must have jurisdiction under both the
Utah Long-Arm Statute and under the federal principles of due
process.

Mabud v. United Airlines, 717 P.2d 1350, (Utah

1986).

7-

The principle of due process through "minimum
contacts" was set out by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case of International Shoe Co. v, State of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
This principle is that before a state can invoke jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant, it must be determined that the
defendant had certain minimum contacts with the state.
This principle was refined by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

In Hanson v.

Denckla, the court held that to obtain jurisdiction over a
non-resident, in addition to minimum contacts, it must be
shown that the non-resident defendant also availed itself of
the privileges of the forum state's laws.
The United States Supreme Court expanded this
doctrine into the "stream of commerce" theory in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559,
62 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1980).

In World-Wide Volkswagen, the

plaintiffs had purchased an Audi automobile in New York.
They were then involved in an accident in Oklahoma.

A product

liability action was filed in Oklahoma naming as defendants the
manufacturer, the importer, the distributor, and the retailer.
The manufacturer and importer conceded jurisdiction.

The trial

court granted the retailer's motion to dismiss on the basis
that it did not have minimum contacts with Oklahoma.
this was affirmed.

On appeal

However, in reaching this decision, the

court distinguished the situations of the manufacturer and

-8-

importer from that of the distributor and retailer.

The court

stated that if a manufacturer's or distributor's sale of a
product is not an isolated occurrence, but instead is an
attempt to "directly or indirectly" serve the market for its
product in other states, then it is not unreasonable for it to
be subject to suit in one of those foreign states if its
product causes an injury there.

A manufacturer indirectly

serves a market by placing its project in the "stream of
commerce" where it can foresee that it will be sold in other
states•
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied
the stream of commerce theory to Utah law in the case of
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Philadelphia Resins
Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985).

The facts in

Philadelphia Resins were that an individual pilot, Mr.
Rogers, while residing in Arkansas, ordered various cable
products from defendant Philadelphia Resins Corp., a
Pennsylvania corporation.

Mr. Rogers then moved to Utah and

brought the cable with him to use in his employment in Utah.
The cable failed and caused an accident in Utah.

The trial

court found there was jurisdiction over the defendant.

On

appeal the Tenth Circuit Court reversed.
In reaching its decision the Tenth Circuit Court
reviewed the stream of commerce theory and examined the
defendants1 contacts with the State of Utah.

The court noted

that the defendant had only made a minuscule number of sales of
its products in Utah, may have advertised in magazines that

-9

reached the State of Utah, and had its cable fail while in use
there.

The court determined that these were insufficient

contacts with Utah.

It determined that the defendant's

representatives might have known their products were to be used
in the Rocky Mountain region, but they could not specifically
foresee that their product was destined for the Utah market.
The court stated that if a defendant's product comes into Utah
through the result of deliberate, "although perhaps indirect"
efforts of the defendant, then jurisdiction exists.

The court

gave as an example a situation where a defendant indirectly
places its product into the "stream of commerce" in another
state with the expectation of its distribution in Utah.

As a

counter position, the court gave the example of a product
coming into Utah through the fortuitous unconnected efforts of
a third party.

It stated that the Utah courts would not have

jurisdiction in such a situation.

This was the situation in

Philadelphia Resins, as it was Rogers' actions and not those of
the defendant that caused the product to come into Utah.
This court dealt with the issue of jurisdiction in
Utah over foreign retailers, but not foreign manufacturers, in
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974).
In Pellegrini, a California resident purchased a vehicle in
California.

She then moved to Utah, where she brought suit

alleging negligence in dealer preparation and breach of
warranty.

She named as defendants the California retailer and

Ford, the manufacturer.

This court held there was no

jurisdiction over the California retailer.
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However, the court

stated that there is a distinct difference between the
manufacturer and the retailer, since the manufacturer is
interested in selling its similar products in
foreign states.
This court addressed the same issue of jurisdiction
over a foreign retailer in Burt Drilling, Inc. v.
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).

In Burt Drilling,

a Utah plaintiff contacted a foreign defendant to request a
price quotation for the purchase of drilling equipment.

After

negotiations the equipment was purchased and shipped to
Denver.

However, the parties stipulated for financial security

reasons that the situs of the equipment was in Utah.
filed.

Suit was

The trial court granted the retailer's motion to

dismiss.

On appeal, this court held that since the retailer

sought the protection of Utah laws, that it was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Utah courts.

In a concurring opinion

Justice Stewart discussed the stream of commerce theory, and
stated that there was also jurisdiction because the defendant
had knowingly sold a product in Utah.
In his concurring opinion Justice Stewart cited the
Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking
Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1966).

In Phillips, the

plaintiff, an Arizona resident, was injured when the
defendant's baking dish shattered.
corporation.
purchased.

The defendant was an Ohio

There was no evidence where the dish was

The defendant's products were sold throughout

Arizona at the time the suit was filed.
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The trial court

granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.

On appeal the

Arizona Supreme Court rejected the "foreseeability" test.

This

test allows jurisdiction only where the defendant can foresee
it might be
sued.

Instead, the Arizona court held that since manufacturers

were more concerned with the overall sale of their products,
not where the product is sold, that a "fairness" test should be
applied.

The court then held that whether it is fair to

exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer should
be determined by:
1)

The nature and size of the manufacturer's

2)

The economic independence of the plaintiff; and

3)

The nature of the cause of action, including the

business;

applicable law and pretrial matters.
The product involved here, like many other products
sold, distributed, and used in Utah, was manufactured in
Japan.

The Japanese sold the product through a California

importer who distributed the product throughout the western
United States.

The Japanese representatives met with the

importer and discussed the nature of the importer's business.
They were told that the importer operated a regional business
and that their products could thus end up at various locations
throughout the United States.

The importer in the course of

selling and distributing Japanese products has routinely
distributed products to companies in Utah.
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This product, a

chopping maul, was advertised and offered for regular sale in
Utah by retailers Ernst Home Centers and Pay fN Pack.
The specific maul which the plaintiff was using was
purchased from Ernst in Idaho.
third party.

It was brought to Utah by a

The plaintiff was injured while using it in Utah.

The plaintiff originally brought suit against all the
American entities who distributed and sold the product.

The

distributors and now the plaintiff seek to hold the
manufacturer responsible for the defect, if any, in the
product.

The manufacturer and exporter have stated that since

this specific product was purchased in Idaho that, even though
the same product was offered for sale in Utah, the Utah courts
do not have jurisdiction over them.
Judge Page's Ruling of February 25, 1986, on which
his order of dismissal is based, found that the subject
logsplitter was purchased in Idaho and transported to Utah by
a third party, where it caused the injury.

He further found

that there was no evidence that logsplitters such as the one
in question had ever been advertised or sold in Utah.

He also

found that neither of the Japanese defendants had ever
advertised or sold any products in the State of Utah.

He then

held, on the basis of the above cited cases, that the presence
of the Japanese defendants in Utah was the result of the
actions of an unconnected third party, or of fortuitous events
over which they had no control, and not through their conscious
efforts to serve the Utah market.
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If the statement of facts relied upon by Judge Page
was correct, his application of the law might also be correct.
However, the findings of fact set forth in his Ruling are
incorrect.

It is undisputed that WECO chopping mauls were

regularly advertised, sold and distributed in the Utah market
at the time of injury as well as several years prior thereto.
When the above facts are applied to the stream of
commerce theory, it is apparent that the Utah courts have
jurisdiction over the Japanese defendants.

The Japanese

manufacturer and exporter intended to and clearly did place
WECO products in both the Western United States1 and Utah's
stream of commerce.

They knew that by selling the product to

Mansour, a western regional importer, that the product would
be distributed throughout the western United States.

The

products were then distributed throughout the western states,
and specifically Utah.
Utah marketplace.

The Japanese thus directly served the

As they were involved in the Utah stream of

commerce they should be responsible if one of their products is
defective and causes a problem in Utah.
The Japanese argument that the Utah courts do not
have jurisdiction over them because this product was sold in
Idaho is not logical.

If this were true, then all

manufacturers who sell products in Utah can only be responsible
if the specific product in question is purchased in Utah.

In

today's marketplace, manufacturers such as Toyota, Datsun,
and in this case, Hirota Tekko, serve to profit from the
sale of their products in Utah.

Therefore, they should subject
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themselves to the Utah court1s jurisdiction

no matter where

the specific defective product that causes the problem may have
been purchased.

Any other result will mean that a plaintiff

who is injured by a product must track the origin of that
specific product and the manufacturer to the place of sale, and
then bring suit there.
plaintiffs.

This is an undue burden to place on

Further, this is contrary to the due process

provisions of the Federal Constitution, and also contrary to
Utah law which attempts to find jurisdiction over foreign
defendants to the fullest degree.
Hirota and Okada had sufficient minimum contacts
with Utah to be held responsible in Utah if appellant Parry had
been injured by a WECO logsplitter that was purchased in
Utah.

The fact that this particular product was purchased in

Idaho does not suddenly erase these minimum contacts.
Therefore, appellants respectfully request that this
Court enter a ruling reversing the trial court and finding that
the State of Utah has jurisdiction over Japanese manufacturer,
Hirota Tekko, K.K., and Japanese exporter Okada Hardware,
and remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings.
II
HIROTA TEKKO WAIVED ITS JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT BY
SUBMITTING A PRO SE ANSWER TO MANSOURfS COUNSEL OF RECORD.
The summons and a copy of the third-party complaint
were served upon third-party defendant Hirota Tekko,
K.K. on or about August 10, 1985. Mr. Masakuzo Hirota,
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the president of Hirota Tekko, mailed to Mansour's
counsel of record a statement directed to the Second District
Court in and for Davis County.

The statement, which is

attached as Appendix "E,M said Mwe havenft any responsibility
about this matter, Civil No. 33206.fl

The document was signed

in both English and Japanese by Mr. Hirota.

The address of

the Second Judicial District Court was not contained on the
summons or third-party complaint.

The only address on these

documents was that of Mansourfs counsel of record.

Therefore

the Hirota statement was mailed directly to this counsel.
Upon receipt, Mansour's counsel of record mailed the
statement directly to the clerk of court for Davis County.
The Hirota statement makes no claims about
jurisdiction.

Instead, these claims were raised for the first

time in Hirota1s motion to dismiss.
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person may be asserted in a responsive pleading, or may be made
by motion before any further pleading is required.

Rule 12(h)

states that a party waives all defenses and objections which it
does not present either by motion, or if no motion is filed, in
its answer or reply, other than the defense of failure to state
a claim, or the defense of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

An objection to a jurisdictional defect is

waived if not asserted by the party as provided in Rule 12(h).
Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976).
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In this matter, Hirotafs president prepared his own
pro se response to the summons and complaint that was served
upon him.
answer.

He did not raise any jurisdictional issues in this
Instead, he made a general denial and statement that

his organization had no responsibility for this matter.

This

document was then submitted by mail to the third-party
plaintiff's counsel, who forwarded it to the Court.
Hirotafs letter was a responsive pleading that was
adequate to put plaintiff's claims against this defendant at
issue amd avoid default.

(See Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d

1325 (Utah 1975); Lord v. Shaw# 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983)
71 C.J.S. Pleading, Sec. 103-105.)
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the contents of summons inform the defendant that
he must answer the complaint in writing within a certain time
or suffer a default judgment.

It does not require that the

answer be typed, prepared by an attorney or otherwise meet the
formal requirements of pleadings.

In addition,, fundamental

due process requires the summons to adequately inform the
defendant what must be done to avoid default.

The summons

served on Hirota only required it to answer the complaint in
writing and file it with the Court Clerk to prevent a default.
This is precisely what Hirota intended to do and eventually
did.

To now hold that the letter is not a sufficient answer

would be contrary to Utah constitutional law pertaining to
procedural due process.
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The Masakazu Hirota document was the first thing
filed on Hirota1s behalf with the Davis County clerk of
court.

It did not raise the jurisdictional issues. Therefore,

pursuant to Rule 12(h), this defense was waived.

Since the

defense was waived, the district court was in error in allowing
the motion to dismiss to proceed.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellants ask this Court to
reverse the trial court's order of dismissal for two reasons.
First, because the Utah courts have personal jurisdiction over
the Japanese manufacturer and exporter.

These Japanese

entities manufactured and sold products that eventually were
sold in Utah.

This is sufficient to give the Utah courts

jurisdiction over them if a like product, even though purchased
in Idaho, causes a personal injury in Utah.
Secondly, manufacturer Hirota waived any
jurisdictional defense by filing a pro se answer.

This answer

was the first responsive pleading filed and did not raise the
jurisdictional defense.

Therefore, as the trial court erred in

entering its order of dismissal, appellants seek a ruling from
this Court finding the Utah courts have jurisdiction over the
Japanese entities, and striking the trial courtfs order of
dismissal, and further remanding this matter to the trial court
for further proceedings.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL fclS
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF ^TAH
^

_

vs.
ERNST HOME CENTER CORP,
et. al.

//

/Sr:-r^\^

BRUCE G. PARRY,
Plaintiff,

FED

RULING ON THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO QUASH
SERVICE
Civil No. 2-33206

Defendants.

The Court having heard the arguments of counsel, and
having reviewed the memorandum and pleadings submitted and being
fully advised in the premises rules as follows:
First as to defendant's motion to quash the summons
in this matter on the basis that service upon them did not comply
with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds
that each of the defendants, Okada Hardware Ltd and Hirota Tekko KK,
were served with a copy of the Summons and Third Party Complaint
pursuant to the Convention of Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Criminal Matters, by service on
the Japanese Minister of Fireign Affairs.

The Minister, by letter

dated September 6, 1985, certified that the Summons and Third
Party Complaint had been served on the defendant, Okada, on August
2, 1985, and on defendant, Hirota, on August 10, 1985.
The Court concludes that such service substantially
complies with the requirements of Rule 4(b)(3) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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The Court having concluded that the service procedure
was correct, next turns to the question of whether the fact that
the Summons served on these defendants required a response within
twenty (20) days rather than the thirty (30) days required of
non-resident defendants under §78-27-25 Utah Code Annotated was
such a defect as to justify the quashing of the Summons.
The Court notes that Section 4(h) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a summons to be amended at any time unless it
appears that material prejudice would result to substantial rights
of the parties.
In the matter under consideration, each of the defendants
was served between August 2nd and August 10thf 1985.

Counsel

for each of the defendants requested and received extentions in
which to file pleadings until January of 1986.
The Court concludes that defendants were properly served
and were put on notice that they had to take action to defend
themselves.

There is no evidence that defendants relied on the

twenty (20) day period to their detriment; on the contrary, they
were granted in excess of one hundred (100) days to respond. Myers
vs. Investment Corporation, 632 P2d 879 Ut. (1981)
The Court notes that as the Utah Sumpreme Court stated
in Myers, supra:
"In the absence of prejudice, it is appropriate
to pursue that policy which favors resolution
of disputes on the merits rather than technicalities" Supra, P. 882
In that light, the Court will allow the summons to be
amended on its own motion and finds that service on the defendants
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of Mansour's Third Party Complaint and Summons was proper.
Defendants have conceded, as the Court would have found,
that service of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on these
defendants was valid.
The Court, having concluded that service of plaintiff's
Amended Complaint and Mansour's Third Party Complaint against
these defendants was valid, next turns to the more difficult question of whether the Court has jurisdiction over these defendants
pursuant to our Long Arm Statute and the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 78-27-24(3) Utah Code Annotated, as amended,
extends the jurisdiction of Utah Courts to non-resident defendants
who cause injury within the State by tortious acts or breach of
warranty.
In the matter before the Court the plaintiff was allegedly
injured by a flying piece of metal from a log splitter manufactured
by defendant Hirota and exported to the United States by defendant
Okada.
Under the pleadings, it is clear that the facts of this
case come within the purview of the Long Arm Statute so as to
give the Court

in personam jurisdiction over these defendants

pursuant to that provision; however, the analysis does not stop
there.

No* only must the allegations place the defendants in that

catagory of persons over whom our State legislature has extended
State jurisdiction, but in addition must be examined to determine
if there exists such minimum contacts between the forum state
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and the defendants such that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction would not offend the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice required under the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. International Shoe Co. vs. State of Washington
et. al., 326 US 310r 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L Ed. 95 (1945)
At the outset it must be noted that the burden of proving
basis for jurisdiction is on the party asserting it and that the
facts of each case must be examined independently.
In the matter before the Court, the Court finds the
facts as follows:
1.

That the defendant, Hirota Manufacturing Company,

is a Japanese company which manufactures various products in Japan
which it sells to Okada Hardware in Japan for export to the United
States.
2.

That Okada Hardware Ltd is a Janapese corporation

which purchases items for exportation to the United States, among
them the log splitter in question.
3.

That Okada Hardware exported the log splitter to

the Third Party plaintiff, Monsour, in California for sale in
the United States.
4.

That Monsour sold the log splitter to its distributor

Pacific Marine Schwabaker.
5.

That Pacific Marine Schwabaker then sold the log

splitter to various retailers in the western U.S., including
Pay N Save/Ernst Home Center Corporation.
6.

That Ernst Home Center in Twin Falls, Idaho, sold

the said log splitter to one Linda Thayne in December, 1979.
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7.

That said Linda Thayne gave the log splitter to

a relative in Utah.
8.

That plaintiff was injured while using the log splitter

in Utah in January of 1980.
9.

That the log splitter in question was never advertised

or sold in the State of Utah.
10.

That defendants may have been informed that the

log splitter would be sold in the western United States.
11.

That there was no evidence that either of the defendants

either sold or advertised any of their products in the State of
Utah.
It is clear to the Court that under the more traditional
concepts of "minimum contacts", the facts of this case would not
provide sufficient basis to justify the Court in extending in
personam jurisdiction; however, as a result of increased trade
and interaction between the various states and nations over the
past ten years there has developed a theory of rationale for extending jurisdiction under a doctrine referred to as the "stream of
commerce theory" in certain cases.
The concept was most recently treated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in World-Wide Volkwagon Corp. vs. Woodson, 444 US 286, 100
S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed 2d 490(1980); and even more recently by our
own 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Fidelty Casualty Co. vs.
Philadelphia Resins Corp, (USCA 10th Cir.) 766 F2d 440 (1985).
In World-Wide, supra, the Supreme Court refused to grant
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in personam jurisdiction over a New York Audi dealer and distributor
doing business in New Yorkf New Jersey and Connecticut, to an
Oklahoma court.

In that case, plaintiff, who had purchased the

vehicle from defendant in New York, was injured in Oklahoma while
on his way to Arizona in an accident which involved an alleged
defect in the vehicle.
The Court, in denying jurisdiction to the Oklahoma court,
found no circumstances on which to predicate in personam jurisdiction
and stated:
"Petitioners (defendants)carry on no activity
whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and
perform no services there. They avail themselves
of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma
law. They solicit no business there either through
sales persons or through advertising reasonably
calculated to reach the state. Nor does the record
show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale
or retail to Oklahoma residents, or customers, or
that they indirectly, through other, serve or seek
to serve the Oklahoma market". World-wide, supra
62 LEd 2d 493.
The Court went on to say that Oklahoma was attempting
to assert jurisdiction on one isolated occurance and whatever
inferences that could be drawn therefrom and that was not a sufficent
basis for jurisdiction.
In a more recent case, and one involving the application
of Utah law, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend
in personam jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania corporation where
some of its defective cable, sold in Arkansas, was subsequently
brought to Utah by the purchaser and caused damage in Utah.
Fidelty Casualty Co. vs. Philadelphia Resins Corp., supra.
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The facts in that case were that a helicopter pilot
in Arkansas purchased fiber cable from defendant in Pennsylvania
for delivery in Arkansas.

An employee of the defendant was told

it would be used in the Rocky Mountains in seismic operations.
The pilot brought the cable to Utah where it failed, causing damage.
The evidence showed that the pilot had seen advertising for the
cable in a national trade magazine which presumably reached Utah;
that defendant sold a variety of products in all fifty states?
that from 1978 through 1980 defendant sold to 10 customers in
Utah; that Utah sales were less than 1/10 of 1% of defendant's
gross sales; that defendant never sold any cable in Utah.
The Court, in denying jurisdiction, held that a miniscule
number of sales of products other than cable, advertising in a
national trade magazine that presumably reaches Utah, and the
failure of one of its defective cables in Utah after the cable
was taken there by a customer, was not sufficient minimum contacts
to justify the lower courtfs imposing in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant.
In so ruling the Court stated that if defendant's products
come into the forum state as the result of the actions of an unconnected third party or of fortuitous events over which defendant
has no control, the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction
of the forum state.
The Court further noted that foreseeability alone has
never been a sufficient benchmark for in personam jurisdiction
under Due Process.

The mere liklihood that a product would find
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its way into the forum state was not enough; rather, it is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court
there.
In this case the plaintiff and Third Party defendant,
Monsour, have the burden of proving to the Court sufficient basis
to justify the extention of in personam jurisdiction over these
defendants.

While this court does not entirely agree with the

decision of the Circuit Court in Fidelity, supra, it does find
that the facts in this case are insufficient to support in personam
jurisdiction over the defendants Hirota Tekko KK and Okada Hardware
Co., Ltd. and the complaints against these defendants are dismissed.
Counsel for Okada is directed to prepare an Order in
accordance with the Court's ruling.
DATED this _ ^ \ day of February, A.D., 1986.
BY THE COURT:

£JJ..^ J . (x~~
RODNEY S^/PAGE
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ruling on Motions to Mary Ellen Sloan, 1000
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Roger Fairbanks,
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Street, Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, Donald Purser,
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Deputy-Clerk

Jerry H. Kindinger
RYAN, SWANSON, HENDEL & CLEVELAND
32nd Floor, The Bank of California Center
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Telephone: (206) 464-4224
Roger P. Christensen
Richard C. Rife
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Telephone: (801) 355-3431
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE G. PARRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ERNST HOME CENTER CORPORATION,
a Washington corporation; PAY
f
N SAVE, a Washington corporation; ERNST HOME CENTER CORP.,
doing business in Idaho; TOM
McCLOSKEY; MONSOUR, INC., d/b/a
West Coast Mercantile Company
and also known as WECO; JOHN
DOE #1 a citizen or subject of
a foreign state; and JOHN DOE
#2, a citizen or subject of a
foreign state,
Defendants.
ERNST HOME CENTER CORPORATION,
a V/ashington corporation; PAY
'N SAVE, a Washington corporation; ERNST HOME CENTER CORP.,
doing business in Idaho,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
TO ERNST HOME CENTER CORP.,
PAY 'N SAVE AND ERNST HOME
CENTER CORP. (Idaho)

Civil No. 33206

PACIFIC MARINE SCHWABACHER, a
foreign corporation,
Third-Party Defendant.

Defendants Ernst Home Center Corporation, Pay !N Save, and Ernst
Home Center Corp. (hereinafter "Ernst") hereby answers plaintiff Bruce C*
Parry's interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
person

answering

State the name, address & occupation of the

these interrogatories

on behalf of the

foregoing

defendants.
ANSWER NO .1: Dale L. Colbert
Former Ernst Tool buyer
5305 80th Street East
Tacoma, Washington 98011
Scott Grant
Director of Loss Prevention
1511 6th Avenue
Seattle, WA
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

98101

State the factual basis for your claim in the

Third Defense that the accident and injuries were caused by misuse of the
product by plaintiff.
ANSWER NO. 2:

The photograph of the log splitter in question

indicates a chip on the blunt end of the tool.
involves

Normal use of the log splitter

striking wood with the sharp end of the tool.

Using the tool as a

sledge hammer to strike or drive hard materials is a misapplication, which
the location of the chip on the blunt end of the log splitter indicates.
Discovery is continuing, and further evidence of misuse may be discovered.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

State the factual basis of your claim in the

Fourth Defense that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and assumption of
the risk*
ANSWER NO. 3:
"wood splitting maul."

Plaintiff may have struck a metal object with this
In addition, plaintiff failed to use elementary

safety equipment such as protective eyewear.

Discovery is continuing, and

further evidence of negligence and assumption of the risk may be discovered*
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

State the factual basis of your claim in the

Fifth Defense that the accident and injuries complained of were caused by the
negligence of third parties.
ANSWER NO. 4:

Ernst has not done sufficient discovery at this time

to state what other parties were involved.

Ernst will supplement this

answer following the completion of discovery.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

State whether the product was for sale or

offered for sale at any time at the Ernst Home Center Corp. doing business in
Twin Falls, Idaho (hereinafter "Ernst, Idaho").
ANSWER NO. 5: Yes.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

If your answer to No. 5 is yes, state the

dates that the product was available for sale at Ernst, Idaho.
ANSWER NO* 6:

The product has been available for sale at Ernst in

Idaho on an intermittent basis.

Each store orders its own products and,

therefore, Ernst is unable to determine the dates the product was available.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

If there is more than one Ernst Home Center

in Twin Falls, state the addresses of each store.
ANSWER NO. 7:
Idaho.

There is only one Ernst Home Center in Twin Falls,

BnSftftQG&SOM TO. §\

^as thfc productfc^ilablfc?or aal^ in ^Y^

State of Utah by Ernst and Pay fN Save?
ANSWER NO. 8;

The product w£S available for sale in the State of

Utah by Ernst Home Center Corporation only.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

If your answer to No. 8 is yes, state the

dates that the product was available for sale and the locations that it was
available for sale.

®

ANSWER NO. 9:

The product was available for sale at all Ernst Home

Center locations in Utah.

product was available.

Ernst is unable to determine the dates the

See answer to Interrogatory 6.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: What is the relationship between Ernst Home
Center Corporation and Pay

f

N Save; and between Ernst Home Center

Corporation and Ernst Home Center, Idaho?
ANSWER NO. 10: Ernst Home Center Corporation and Ernst Home
Center, Idaho are both divisions of Pay Ml Save Corporation of Washington.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: From whom did Ernst and Pay Mtf Save obtain
the product for retail sale.
ANSWER NO. 11: On information and belief, Ernst obtained the
product from Pacific Marine Schwaba^her, now doing business as Pacific
Marine.
INTERROGATORY NO, 12: Does Ernst and Pay f N Save presently sell or
offer for sale the product?
ANSWER NO. 12: Ernst does;
INTERROGATORY NO* 13:

Pay fN Save does not.

If your answer to No. 12 is yes, state the

names and addressees of each store in which it is offered for sale.

ANSWER NO* 13:

Center

The product is offered for sale in all Ernst Home

locations*
INTERROGATORY NO, 14: Does Ernst and Pay fN Save contend that it

and all agents or employees of theirs had no knowledge whatsoever of any
hazard, danger, defect or defective condition existing in the product and/or
the subject product prior to the alleged occurrence?
ANSWER NO. 14: Ernst objects to this interrogatory on the grounds
that it is vague and ambiguous.

In the spirit of cooperation, however, and

without waiving its objection, Ernst will say that the product, like all
cutting and striking tools, has some inherent and obvious dangers and
hazards„

Ernst did not have knowledge of any defect or defective condition

existing in the product.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

interrogatory

If

is in the negative1

the

please

answer

identify

to

all

the

hazards,

preceding

dangers,

defects, or defective conditions in the product and/or* subject product of
which Ernst's and Pay !N Save, its agents, or its employees had knowledge
prior to the alleged occurrence, stating for each such hazards, danger,
defect or defective condition:
a.

How and from whom did Ernst and Pay fN Save or its agent(s) or

employe^s) gain such knowledge;
b.

the identity, by name, address and job title of the agent(s) or

employe^s) of Ernst and Pay fN Save who first acquired such knowledge;
c.

when such knowledge was acquired;

d>

a full description of the hazard, danger, defect or defective

condition;

f.

the action or actions, if any, Ernst and Pay fN Save or any agent

or employee of them took to warn of, repair or correct such defect or
defective condition so as to safeguard the plaintiff or any user of the
product *
g.

the possible results of such hazard, danger, defect or

defective condition which Ernst and Pay fN Save foresaw.
ANSWER NO. 15: Not applicable.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

Has Ernst and Pay fN Save ever conducted any

recall campaigns, operations, programs or activities which involved the
product or similar products?
ANSWER NO. 16:

Not to Ernst's knowledge.

INTERROGATORY NO, 17:

If

the

answer

to

the

preceding

interrogatory is in the affirmative, please state and describe in complete
detail each such recall campaign, operation, program or activity, including
but not limited to such information as:
a.

the exact date of the announcement or beginning of the campaign

or operation;
b»

the purpose of the campaign or operation, in terms of potential

or real defects sought to be checked and/or corrected;
c.

the types or model of products involved in the campaign or

operation;
d.

the number of products of each type referred to in sub-section

(c) sought to be examined and/or corrected.
e. the number of products of each type actually examined and/or
corrected.
ANSWER NO. 17: Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO, 16:

Has Ernst and Pay fN Save ever been cited,

criticized, or reprimanded with respect to this product and state the name
and address of the person who has custody of the records relating to same?
ANSWER NO, 18: Not to Ernst's knowledge.
INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

Has

there

ever

been

any

litigation

initiated against Ernst and Pay !N Save concerning the product, and alleged
defect?

If so,

please:

a.

give the title and date of each such action;

b.

outline the contents of the complaint filed in each such action;

c.

state the name and address of the court involved;

d.

give the name and address of the attorney for the plaintiff in

each such action.
ANSWER NO. 19: Not to Ernst's knowledge.
INTERROGATORY NO, 20:

State if Ernst and Pay fN Save has retained

any expert with respect to this matter and state whether the expert has
prepared a written report.
ANSWER NO. 20: Not at this time.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

If

the

answer

to

the

foregoing

interrogatory is in the affirmative, state the name and address and
professional title of said expert and state the substance of the facts that
said expert is expected to testify to, the opinion held by said expert and
which he will testify to, and the grounds of each opinion that said expert
will testify to.
ANSWER NO. 21:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Does Ernst and Pay fN Save, its attorneys,

or agents, have any statements taken from any person concerning the

happening or event giving rise to this action, other than statements
supplied by the plaintiff?
ANSWER NO. 22:

Not at this time.

INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

If

the

answer

to

the

foregoing

interrogatory is in the affirmative, state the name arid last known address of
each person from whom a statement was taken, the date when said statement was
taken, who was present when the statement was given, whether such statement
is in writing or has been reduced to writing, and who has possession or
custody of the statement or a copy hereof.
ANSWER NO. 23:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 24:

Does Ernst and

P£y

f

N Save have any

photographs of the product or the subject product?
ANSWER NO. 24:

Not to Ernst's knowledge.

INTERROGATORY NO, 25:

If your answer to No. 24 is yes, state the

name and address of the person who has possession of said photographs.
ANSWER NO. 25:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY N0» 26:

Do you or did you manufacture the product

described in plaintiff's complaint?
ANSWER NO. 26: No.
INTERROGATORY NO. 27:
a.

If not, state:

the name and address of each manufacturer or supplier from whom

you obtained this product;
b.

the tradename of the product;

c.

whether you prepared specifications concerning the size,

design or other qualities of this product.

d.

whether you obtained any written warranties concerning the

product from your suppliers.
ANSWER NO. 27:
a.

Okiedo is the manufacturer of this product.

Its address, on

information and belief, is P.O. Box 22, Meki, Hyogo-Pref, Japan.
Mansour is the importer of this product.
Los Angeles, California

His address is:

Cecil

5409 West Adams,

90016.

b.

Weco maul.

c.

No specifications were prepared.

d.

No warranties were prepared.

INTERROGATORY NO. 28:

State verbatim the written specification

you submitted, or written warranties you received, concerning the qualities
of the product.
ANSWER N0> 28:

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 29:

Did or are you aware of anyone who performed

any chemical and/or metallographic analysis of the product?
ANSWER NO. 29:

Not known.

INTERROGATORY NO. 30:
a.

If so, state!:

the name, address and job title of each person who was in charge

of each test performed.
b.

the date each test was conducted%

c.

the method used to sample the material that was tested.

d.

the size of the samples tested.

e.

a description of procedure used to prepare the samples for

f.

the results of the chemical and/or metallographic analysis*

testing*

ANSWER NO. 30:

Not applicable.

nrraFffiPGftTPiri ~RD. 31: Describe in detail £rnst and "Pay VI\I Savers
relationship to the product, either as manufacturer, assembler, importer,
retailer, etc.
ANSWER NO. 31: Retailer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 32: State the length of time the product has
been available for retail sale by Ernst and Pay 'N Save in the United States.
ANSWER NO. 32: Unknown.
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Did Ernst and Pay 'N Save provide written
warranties regarding the product?
ANSWER N0> 33: No.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3^:
ANSWER NO. 3^:

If so, please state the warranty verbatim.

Not applicable.

INTERROGATORY NO. 35:

Did Ernst and Pay

V

A Save inspect t'ne

product for defects in manufacture?
ANSWER NO. 35: No.
INTERROGATORY NO. 36:

State

the

names,

addresses,

and

occupations of any and all individuals known to Ernst and Pay 'N Save that
would have knowledge of the manufacture, export, import, distribution, or of
the retailing of the product.
ANSWER NO. 36:

Present distributor:

Jensen Byrd Co., 310 West

Riverside Ave., Spokane, Wash. 99220; prior distributor:
Schwabacher; Importer:

Pacific Marine

Cecil Mansour, 5409 West Adams, Los Angeles, CA

90016.
INTERROGATORY NO. 37: Are Ernst and Pay 'N Save incorporated in
the State of Utah or authorized to do business in "Ota'n?

ANSWER NO. 37: Ernst and Pay fN Save are authorized to do business
in Utah*
INTERROGATORY NO, 38:

If your answer is yes, state-the date of

incorporation or when authorization was received and whether Ernst and Pay
f

N Save continue to be incorporated or authorized to do business in Utah*
ANSWER NO. 38:

December 28, 1983.

DATED this '/5

day of April, 1984.

Dale L. Colbert
/

STATE OF

-

//JrtAM7l#fa
//,

COUNTY OF MM
On the

• (1
U

o?vS

: ss.
)
day of '^//dZ^-

, 1984, personally appeared

before me Dale L. Colbert, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

N O T A W ^ B L I C - residing in:
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/

This is to certify that on the //-— day offfipfrSl, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Mary Ellen Sloan
Attorney for Plaintiff
500 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jerry Kindinger
RYAN, SWANSON, HENDEL & CLEVELAND
32nd Floor, The Bank of California Center
Seattle, Washington 98164
Gary D. Stott
Robert G. Gilchrist
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
CSB Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
;
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

^r.
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.: a Motion to Reconsider, - , - *h.: -\

r.y limited c, i :umstances u.tn the or-iec t:r

MT : o: .
placir.q

::

*,'^t i '

~
c .•. .

t

irr)r

p^'

+

^-~. •

r--

• - owl edgeable about
*

cons .aerat i: « '• i th- appropriate time.
j n ^his xaatter i • * *:<• -itJLcal question,, of jurisdiction the
position of co-counsel

*i^ ^ase the Court has reconsidered, its

decision based, upon, the new material submitter bu1 t .-ids- tha? as
her e wiii? re

ile f encJari t; s a re i s o l a t e d 1:

distribution from the transaction which caused the injury, the
mere fact that the product is sold in this state does not alter
the Court's opinion.

The Court still concludes that the

defendant engaged in no purposeful contacts with the State of
Utah which would provide the necessary minimum contacts to
justify the State exercising jurisdiction in this matter.
The Court also stands by its ruling that defendant Hirota
Tekko did not submit itself to jurisdiction of the Court by its
letter of response.
The Court will execute the order of dismissal of Okada
Hardware and Hirota Tekko forthwith.
DATED this

day of April, A.D., 1986.
BY THE COURT:

RODNEY S. PAGE
District Court Judge
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
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PARRY,

ERNST HOML CTNTKK < '(HKPORA I' 1 fill,
et. al.,
Defendants,
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ERNST HOME CENTER, et. al.,
. Third-Party
"Plaintiffs

vs.
HIROTA TEKKO K.K.,
HARDWARE CO., LTD.
Third-Party
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
•

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss

)

Robert G. Gilchrist being first duly sworn deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That he is counsel of record for defendant

and third-party plaintiff Mansour, Inc. in the above
captioned matter.
2.

That during March of 1985, he filed a

stipulation and received an order from this court allowing him
to file and serve a third-party complaint, naming as thirdparty defendants Okada Hardware Company, Ltd., and Hirota
Tekko, K.K.

That he then submitted these documents to the

United States Marshall's Office in Salt Lake City for service
upon these Japanese companies.
3.

That on or about April 22, 1985, he received

a letter from T. Miyauchi, counsel general of Japan,
indicating he was returning the third-party complaints and
summons, as they had not been translated into Japanese.
4*

On or about June 3, 1985, a Japane&e version

o;£ the third-party complaints and summons were submitted ±o
the United States Marshall's Office for service upon the named
third-party defendants.
5.

On or about September 6, 1985, he received a

letter from T. Miyauchi indicating that Okada Hardward
had been served with the third-party complaint and summons on
August 2, 1985.
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6.
?t^~

•*'

September

*

aefendant

. . Tekko, ; . :

.,*;: —

erved v. ' . * J

* r.ird-party

.omplaint and summons - - August .
7.
~ --

:.

Masakazu :i ;

:.,<- president c: third-party defendant Hirota Tekk
responding

* <- **

rd-party complaint and summon?

statir

matter.
8.

On v.; -^ .. September

the original cf tr. . statement ; */ *
for fiiir- *.=> trie -- - -

;-~5

^t- submitted

Hirota t,w t;.^ wuuii

- - --

9.

Septembe.

*, 198?

he was

contacted by attorney Dennis Conroy, who indicated that he
planned t: srrear >- counsel for defendant Okada, and
requeste
extensic.

q
.: . granted.
10.

On or about September 24, 1985, he was

contacted by .Hirota ! s current
exte .
behalf :

; - t'*?d cm

• i MI wn J i n T. O :*.*
-* parties.
11.

On

responsive pleading r--

This extension was granted.
November III, 10 8 5, he re

second teleph;

n i i i »t ,i s < - u r r e n i

sel, requesting a continuance of the extension of time i n
which to file a responsive pleading.
granted.
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This extension was

12.

On or about December 18, 1985, he received a

telephone call from Okada's current counsel who requested an
extension of time until January 6, 1985, to file a responsive
pleading.

This extension was granted.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED t h i s

[if ~~ d a y o f

\S^~+*JtJ\

,

1986.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

T\C.
ROBERT
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GILCHftTST

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this fp>
, 1986.
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/0/30A

Sliding
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true_and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage
prepaid on this /&*•
day of.//gmudba-^
, 1986, to the
following counsel of record: (/
^
H. James Clegg
Stephen J. Hill
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Hinz J. Mahler
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Roger R. Fairbanks
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900 Kearns Building
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Donald J. Purser
ROE, FOWLER & MOXLEY
340 East 400 South
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Mary Ellen Sloan
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1000 Newhouse Building
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